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Cape Colony (1652–1795)1*




This paper provides an overview of the public finances of the Cape Colony 
in the period during which it was governed by the Dutch East India Company 
(1652–1795). Using information from secondary sources, the paper discusses 
the expenditures and revenue sources of the Company at the Cape; in 
addition, it reports findings on the composition and distribution of the tax 
burden derived from an analysis of the “opgaafrolle” (the annual censuses that 
were undertaken to determine tax obligations). It shows that the Company’s 
expenses exceeded its revenues throughout the period under review and that 
the tax system was broadly progressive. While the Dutch East India Company 
invested little in the economic development of the Cape Colony, it did not use 
the fiscal system to extract as much surplus as possible. 
Keywords: South Africa; Colonial tax; Fiscal policy; Extractive; Inclusive; 
Institutions; Cape Colony.
Introduction
The Cape Colony was governed from 1652 to 1795 by the Dutch East India 
Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, hereafter VOC), a private 
company that in 1602 received a charter from the States General of the Dutch 
Republic to act on its behalf in its overseas territories. This paper discusses two 
aspects of the public finances of the Dutch Cape Colony: the degree to which 
its fiscal system was extractive, and how fairly it distributed the tax burden. 
To this end, we present an overview of the revenue sources and the outlays of 
the VOC at the Cape based on secondary sources, as well as the findings of 
an analysis of the “opgaafrolle” (the annual censuses that were undertaken to 
determine tax obligations). We systematise the available information about an 
under-researched aspect of the economic history of the Dutch Cape Colony, 
1 *An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Colonial Fiscal Policy Session at the 16th World Economic 
History Congress, Stellenbosch, on 11 July 2012.
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and provide evidence that has a bearing on contemporary debates about the 
nature and effects of colonial fiscal systems.
Colonial fiscal systems
Drawing on Booth’s discussion of state types in south-east Asia in the late 
colonial period, Frankema identifies four types of colonial state according to 
different configurations of tax burden and levels of public outlay (Image 1):2
•	 “Developmental states”, which have relatively high tax burdens, but whose 
revenues are used productively to promote economic development by financing 
essential public goods.
•	 “Benevolent states”, which have access to external sources of revenue (e.g. 
subsidies from the colonial power) that make it possible to keep tax burdens 
relatively low and still invest heavily in human resources.
•	 “‘Night watchmen’ (or minimalist) states”, which collect low levels of 
government revenue that preclude adequate human capital investment and limit 
public spending to the maintenance of law and order and basic administrative 
functions.
•	 “Extractive states”, which strive to maximise government revenue, using it 
mainly to expand the area of the colony or to enrich officials, investors and 
other members of colonial elites.
Fiscal systems changed markedly from the second half of the seventeenth 
century to the first half of the twentieth, as did views about the nature of 
states and the rights and obligations of citizens and rulers. Hence, caution 
must be exercised when applying Frankema’s taxonomy (which is based on 
the fiscal systems of late colonial states) to the Dutch Cape Colony. It remains 
pertinent, however, to locate the fiscal system of the Dutch Cape Colony 
along the spectrum from extractive to developmental, provided that such an 
assessment reflects the norms and realities of the time.
In a well-known passage in “An inquiry into the nature and causes of the 
wealth of nations”, Adam Smith denounces the Dutch practice of governing 
colonies by means of a private monopoly company: “Of all the expedients 
that can well be contrived to stunt the natural growth of a new colony, that 
2 A Booth, “Night watchman, extractive, or developmental states? Some evidence from late colonial south-east 
Asia”, Economic History Review, 60(2), 2007, pp. 241–266; E Frankema, “Colonial taxation and government 
spending in British Africa, 1880–1940: Maximizing revenue or minimizing effort?” Explorations in Economic 
History, 48, 2011, p. 138.
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of an exclusive company is undoubtedly the most effectual.”3 Although the 
context of this statement was Smith’s intense dislike of monopolistic trading 
practices, the notion that a profit-seeking company with a mandate to govern 
colonies would also suppress their economic development by imposing heavy 
tax burdens and underproviding important public services has considerable 
intuitive appeal. Furthermore, this notion is strongly reminiscent of the 
treatment of taxation and public expenditure issues in two influential papers 
that link contemporary economic outcomes to institutions established 
in colonial times. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson argue that predatory 
tax systems were among the extractive institutions established by colonial 
authorities in territories where disease environments hampered European 
settlement.4 Sokoloff and Zolt, augmenting an earlier account by Engerman 
and Sokoloff, claim that the elites in the American colonies used the fiscal system 
to entrench economic inequalities: they note that, compared to the colonies 
with fairly equal economic outcomes, areas with higher levels of inequality 
developed more regressive taxation systems dominated by consumption taxes 
and devoted fewer resources to redistributive social programmes.5 
Image 1: Colonial state types 
Source: E Frankema, “Colonial taxation and government spending in British Africa, 1880–1940: Maximizing 
revenue or minimizing effort?” Explorations in Economic History, 48, 2011, p. 138.
3 A Smith, An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations, 1776, E Cannon (Ed.) (London, Methuen 
& Co., 1904), IV.7.44.
4 D Acemoglu, S Johnson and J Robinson, “The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical 
investigation”, American Economic Review, 91(5), 2001, p. 1375.
5 K Sokoloff and EM Zolt, “Inequality and the evolution of institutions of taxation: Evidence from the economic 
history of the Americas”, S Edwards, G Esquivel and G Márquez (Eds), The decline of Latin American economies: 
Growth, institutions, and crises (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2007), pp. 83–136; S Engerman and K 
Sokoloff, “History lessons: Institutions, factors endowments, and paths of development in the new world”, The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(3), 2000, pp. 217–232.
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Yet there are ample grounds, including challenges to the view that imperialism 
was highly profitable to colonial powers and recent analyses of Spanish and 
British colonies,6 for eschewing generalisations about the extractive effects 
of colonial fiscal systems. Irigoin and Grafe argue that the Spanish colonies 
enjoyed considerable fiscal autonomy and that the relationship between the 
Spanish crown and the colonial elites was marked by negotiation, rather 
than command.7 They therefore reject the notion that the tax systems of 
these colonies were highly extractive: “We suggest that this was not a system 
primarily aimed at the extraction of resources or revenues from the colonies 
for the benefit of the metropolis. Instead it successfully aimed at making the 
colonies self-sufficient, with intra-colonial transfers covering the needs of 
regions that either could not or would not raise sufficient revenue.”8 In a study 
of the tax systems of thirty-four British colonies, Frankema finds that settler 
colonies such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand had relatively high tax 
burdens that enabled adequate investment in growth-promoting spending 
programmes and helped to maintain macroeconomic stability.9 He concludes 
that an inability to collect enough tax revenue to fulfil developmental 
functions, because of institutional and geographical factors, may well have 
been a more serious barrier to the development of the British non-settler 
colonies than excessive tax burdens. A subsequent analysis of the combined 
effects of the taxation and public expenditure systems of eight British colonies 
reports marked differences in the degree to which they were extractive.10
These findings by Grafe, Irigoin and Frankema confirm the validity of 
Austin’s warning that bifurcating colonial regimes and institutions (such as 
fiscal systems) into the categories “inclusive” and “extractive” oversimplifies 
reality.11 Austin points out that colonial institutions and policies varied 
markedly over time and space and proposes that the extent to which they were 
extractive should be measured on a continuous rather than binary scale. This 
6 PK O’Brien and L Prados de la Escosura, “The costs and benefits for Europeans from their empires overseas”, 
Revista de Historia Economics, 16(1), 1998, pp. 29–89.
7 MA Irigoin and R Grafe, “The Spanish empire and its legacy: Fiscal redistribution and political conflict in 
colonial and post-colonial Spanish America”, Journal of Global History, 1(2), 2006, pp. 241–267; R Grafe 
and MA Irigoin, “Bargaining for absolutism: A Spanish path to nation-state and empire building”, Hispanic 
American Historical Review, 88(2), 2008, pp. 173–209.
8 MA Irigoin and R Grafe, “The Spanish empire…”, p. 263.
9 E Frankema, “Raising revenue in the British empire, 1870–1940: How ‘extractive’ were colonial taxes?” Journal 
of Global History, 5, 2010, pp. 447–477.
10 E Frankema, “Colonial taxation and government spending in British Africa, 1880–1940: Maximizing revenue 
or minimizing effort?” Explorations in Economic History, 48, 2011, p. 138.
11 G Austin, “The ‘reversal of fortune’ thesis and the compression of history: Perspectives from African and 
comparative economic history”, Journal of International Development, 20, 2008, pp. 996–1027.
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proposal underlines the potential value of case studies for testing and refining 
hypotheses about the nature and effects of colonial fiscal systems, including 
those of company-governed territories such as the Dutch Cape Colony.
The VOC and the economic development of the Cape Colony
It was never the intention of the Lords Seventeen, the shareholders of the 
Company, to establish a colony at the southernmost tip of Africa, but merely 
to establish a refreshment station.12 The high incidence of scurvy on the VOC 
ships made a steady supply of refreshments roughly halfway between Holland 
and the East Indies essential. The Portuguese had long used St Helena as a 
refreshment station, but increasing competition between them, the Dutch 
and the English made the island a less secure refuge. Instead, the shareholders 
of the VOC decided to support the construction and operation of a fort in 
Table Bay, with its only purpose being to supply fresh produce, water, meat 
and fuel to the passing ships. Jan van Riebeeck, the first commander of the 
station, arrived in April 1652 and immediately built a fort. To supply the 
passing ships and sustain the approximately one hundred soldiers and officials 
who resided in the fort, Van Riebeeck also established a vegetable garden 
and initiated the planting of wheat. He soon realised, however, that the help 
of settler farmers would be necessary to supply fresh produce to the several 
thousand sailors who arrived every year as well as the permanent workforce of 
the Company. He had hoped that the native Khoe, a pastoral people, would 
trade their prized cattle for European luxuries, but a constant supply of meat 
was not forthcoming.13
Accordingly, Van Riebeeck released nine Company servants in 1657 
to become free burghers.14 This step started a process of expansion that 
continued, first in a northward and later in an eastward direction, until 
the British occupied the Cape Colony in 1795. By then the total settler 
population had reached 7 129.15 Van Riebeeck’s initial plan was to establish 
a small, close-knit community of intensive wheat farmers around the fort. 
12 G Schutte, “Company and colonists at the Cape, 1652-1795”, R Elphick and H Giliomee (Eds), The shaping of 
South African society, 1652–1840 (Cape Town, Maskew Miller Longman, 1989), p. 288. 
13 R Ross, “The Cape of Good Hope and the world economy, 1652-1835”, R Elphick and H Giliomee (Eds), The 
shaping of South African society, 1652–1840 (Cape Town, Maskew Miller Longman, 1989), p. 244.
14 CW de Kiewiet, A history of South Africa: social and economic (London, Oxford University Press, 1941), pp. 5-6.
15 P van Duin and R Ross, The economy of the Cape Colony in the eighteenth century (Leiden, Center for the History 
of European Expansion, 1987), p. 115.
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Yet, by 1663 the area Van Riebeeck had hoped would have settled a thousand 
farmers, had been filled by only fifteen families on large, extended plots that 
were used predominantly for grazing cattle. The arrival of Simon van der Stel 
in 1679 marked the beginning of a further expansion of the boundaries of 
the Colony into the fertile regions of Stellenbosch and Drakenstein, where 
the Mediterranean climate and favourable soils allowed crop farming.16 
Viticulture thrived in these areas, having been bolstered by the winemaking 
skills of the 159 French Huguenots who arrived in the Colony in 1688 and 
1689.17 Fourie shows that by the mid-eighteenth century the average Cape 
farmer had attained living standards equal to, or even higher than, those of 
the wealthiest countries in Europe, namely England and Holland.18
The wealth of the settlers was partly a result of using slave labour. The first 
slaves had arrived in 1658 from Angola, but most came from the East, either 
from the Indonesian Archipelago and India, or from Madagascar, Mauritius 
and the Mozambican hinterland.19 While slaves were mostly employed by 
the Company during the seventeenth century, farmers increasingly began to 
prefer slave labour to expensive European wage labour (“knechts”). Requested 
by the Lords Seventeen to advise whether to encourage European immigrants 
or slave imports to the Cape, six of the seven members of the Council of 
Policy in Cape Town recommended slave imports to reduce the farmers’ input 
costs.20
Minimising farmers’ costs was necessary if the practice of setting low 
agricultural output prices was to continue. The Company was a monopsonist 
(that is, a sole buyer of goods from many sellers) that bought wheat, wine 
and meat at predetermined prices and sold this produce to Dutch ships and, 
at much-inflated prices, to the non-Dutch ships that visited Table Bay.21 In 
truth, then, it was the low slave labour costs at the Cape (and the exorbitant 
prices paid by non-Dutch ships) that subsidised the costs of trade between 
Holland and the East Indies. Naturally, the farmers complained vehemently 
throughout the period, as epitomised by the Patriot movement of the late 
16 L Guelke, “Freehold farmers and frontier settlers, 1652–1780”, R Elphick and H Giliomee (Eds), The shaping 
of South African society, 1652–1840 (Cape Town, Maskew Miller Longman, 1989), pp. 73–84.
17 J Fourie and D von Fintel, “Settler skills and colonial development: The Huguenot wine-makers in eighteenth-
century Dutch South Africa”, The Economic History Review, in press.
18 J Fourie, “The remarkable wealth of the Dutch Cape Colony: Measurements from eighteenth-century probate 
inventories”, The Economic History Review. 66(2), 2013, pp. 419–448.
19 R Shell, Children of bondage: A social history of the slave society at the Cape of Good Hope, 1652–1838 (Hanover, 
NH, University Press of New England, 1994), pp. 41-42.
20 AL Müller, Die ekonomiese ontwikkeling van Suid-Afrika (Cape Town, Academica, 1979), pp. 15-16.
21 R Ross, “The Cape of Good Hope and the world economy…” p. 245.
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eighteenth century, but the Company continued with the practice until the 
British takeover in 1795.22
Three principles guided the VOC’s commercial policies, and hence its 
economic policies as agent of Dutch activities at the Cape and in the East:23
•	 “Monopoly”: Although the Dutch had long abhorred monopolies, the VOC was 
granted monopoly rights to counter Spanish and Portuguese trading in the East 
Indies more effectively and to avoid the destructive competition that had taken 
place earlier when several Dutch companies were allowed to operate in the East 
Indies. These monopoly rights excluded competition in all trading between the 
Dutch Republic and the East Indies. They allowed the VOC to monopolise all 
inter-regional trade in the East Indies and control all profitable trade within the 
territories it ruled. Apart from distributing the rights to undertake commercial 
activities between itself and private agents, the Company strictly controlled 
private activity. Clear examples of such control were the conditions imposed on 
free farmers and traders in the Cape Colony, which included limiting the types 
of activities allowed and determining the prices at which private agents were 
allowed to sell produce to the Company. Trading monopolies in important 
products were often granted to the highest bidders at public auctions.
•	 “Maximum profits”: The desire to maximise profits was one of the considerations 
behind entrusting Dutch activities in the East Indies to a single company rather 
than several competing ones. This principle resulted in strict economising on 
expenses, reflected in the low salaries and benefits of VOC officials, small armed 
forces in VOC territories and poor maintenance of fortifications.24 Another 
manifestation of the profit motive was the constant striving to sell goods at 
the highest prices possible. This included restricting supply – in some cases 
by force, as in Ambon and Banda in the East Indies when the production of 
cloves and nuts exceeded the Company’s needs. In some territories, agreements 
bound the rulers of indigenous groups to supply high demand commodities to 
the Company at low or zero prices on an annual basis in exchange for assistance 
in local disputes.
•	 “Short-term profits”: The VOC was strongly oriented to short-term profiteering. 
This was clear in its approach to the Cape, where a settlement was established 
primarily for indirect rather than direct commercial benefits. Agricultural 
activities were encouraged only to the extent required by the VOC and little was 
22 R Ross, “The rise of the Cape gentry”, Journal of Southern African Studies, 9(2), 1983, pp. 193–217.
23 HB Thom, “Die beleid van die Nederlandse Oos-Indiese Kompanjie”, AJH van der Walt, JA Wiid and AL 
Geyer (Eds) In Geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika – Deel II (Cape Town, Nasionale Boekhandel Beperk, 1951), pp. 
131–150). For a more detailed discussion of the policies of the VOC, see FS Gaastra, The Dutch East India 
Company: Expansion and Decline (Zutphen, Walburg Pers, 2003). 
24 AL Müller, Die ekonomiese ontwikkeling…, pp. 12-13.
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done to improve techniques or to import crops and livestock that could have 
been useful to indigenous and other private farmers. The expenses required to 
establish viable wool farming in the Cape, for example, were deemed excessive 
and were therefore eschewed. Free colonisation of Dutch-controlled areas was 
mostly discouraged (allowing French Huguenots to settle at the Cape was a 
major exception), probably also because the required costs were not consistent 
with the Company’s short-term orientation.
It was clear early on that the settlement at the Cape was to yield little direct 
profit to the VOC, in part because of the paucity of trading opportunities 
with indigenous peoples. Hence, attempts at economising were common, 
especially with regard to the erection and maintenance of public buildings (for 
example, the Company hospital, warehouses for storing corn and the Castle) 
and the remuneration of officials. The possibility of savings on Company 
salaries also played a part in the decision to allow free colonists. 
The policy of monopolising or strictly controlling all activities that promised 
immediate profits, however, hampered the economic impact of private 
economic activity. The VOC intervention to restrict bartering in livestock 
and trading in fish in 1658 is an example of the difficult conditions faced 
by private agents under VOC control. The development of new industries 
such as whaling, although few fishermen were successful, was dampened by 
export tariffs.25 In addition, whenever a particular activity seemed profitable, 
the Company would prohibit colonists from participating in it and claim it as 
their own. Towards the end of the seventeenth century when grain production 
became adequate to supply the settlement and passing ships, Company 
officials dragged their feet in response to a directive from the Lords Seventeen 
that they should refrain from competing with the colonists by producing 
crops at various outposts.26
As agricultural production at the Cape increased, the monopsonist position 
of the Company and the low prices it offered created major marketing 
problems for Cape farmers. These problems were exacerbated by transport 
difficulties: to reduce costs, the Company left the responsibility for erecting 
and maintaining roads and bridges to the colonists themselves, albeit under 
the supervision of local officials.
25 A Böeseken, “Die Nederlandse kommissarisse en die 18de eeuse samelewing aan die Kaap” (Doctoral thesis, 
Stellenbosch, University of Stellenbosch, 1943), p. 194.
26 MH de Kock, Economic history of South Africa (Cape Town, Juta, 1924), p. 67.
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Such Company policies were implemented with the aim of making the Cape 
Colony self-supporting. The expectation was thus that farmers would sell their 
surplus produce to the Company (at regulated prices) and then purchase their 
necessities from Company shops.27 To pay for the necessary expenditures, the 
Company levied rents and taxes as compensation.
The public finances of the Dutch Cape Colony28
Income
The Company obtained income from its trading and other commercial 
activities. It had a monopoly in the trading of foreign commodities and the 
colonists were obliged to purchase their commodities from its stores. The 
profits from trading were relatively low, however, because of the high levels 
of evasion of the various trade restrictions and the corrupt and fraudulent 
activities of many Company officials. The Company therefore depended 
heavily on taxes for its income. Image 2 shows trading profit statistics in 
selected years from 1725 to 1794.
Image 2: Trading profits, 1725–1794
 Source: MH de Kock, Economic History…, p. 78.
Taxation
The VOC levied two types of taxes in the Cape Colony: general taxes, which 
were collected by the Governor and the Council of Policy and used to cover 
the costs of administering the Colony, and local taxes, which were collected by 
the “landdrosts” and used to defray the expenses associated with their duties.
27 MH de Kock, Economic history…, p. 76.
28 One rixdollar equalled 48 stuivers, while one guilder equalled 16 stuivers at the Cape and in the Netherlands 
Indies and 20 stuivers in the Netherlands. See P van Duin and R Ross, The economy…, p. viii.
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General taxes
The “tithe” (a tax of one tenth of the harvested grain) was imposed on the 
grain brought to the Cape for sale to ships, Company employees and private 
citizens.29 This tax was raised only on the wheat that entered the market for 
consumption, and not on that set aside for seed.30 Tax evasion was extensive 
and the “opgaaf” returns show that there was much under-reporting of wheat 
production. Van Duin and Ross estimate that farmers declared only a third 
of their grain harvests to tax officials.31 Farmers also attempted to reduce 
their tax burdens by selling their grain to each other and to passing ships.32 
Opposition to these taxes grew over time, especially during periods when 
farmers experienced bad harvests and when grain prices were low (such as in 
the 1730s).33 The extent to which the proceeds from the tax on grain increased 
after the authorities introduced stronger measures to reduce tax evasion in 
1790 confirms the low degree of compliance in earlier years (Image 3).
Image 3: Taxes paid on grain, 1790–1797
Source: A Böeseken, “Die Nederlandse kommissarisse en die 18de eeuse samelewing aan die Kaap” (Doctoral 
thesis, Stellenbosch, University of Stellenbosch, 1943), p. 199.
The production of wine and brandy was taxed when it was brought into 
the Cape for sale at a flat rate of one rixdollar per leaguer until 1743 and 
three rixdollars per leaguer thereafter.34 De Kock points out that this tax 
was inequitable, because the rate was not related to the price or quality of 
the wine.35 In addition to other miscellaneous sources of income such as 
monopoly leases and auction duties, the Company also raised revenue from 
customs duties.
29 MH de Kock, Economic history…, p. 81.
30 L Brunt, Property rights and economic growth: Evidence from a natural experiment, Discussion paper, Norwegian 
School of Economics, Bergen, p. 33.
31 P van Duin and R Ross, The economy…, p. 21–24. See also JHD Schreuder, “Die geskiedenis van ons graanbou, 
1752 - 1795” (Masters thesis, Stellenbosch, University of Stellenbosch, 1973), p. 68. 
32 A Böeseken, “Die Nederlandse kommissarisse en die 18de eeuse samelewing aan die Kaap” (Doctoral thesis, 
Stellenbosch, University of Stellenbosch, 1943), p. 199.
33 P van Duin and R Ross, The economy…, p. 30.
34 GJ Jooste, “Die geskiedenis van wynbou en wynhandel in die Kaapkolonie, 1753 - 1795” (Masters thesis, 
Stellenbosch, University of Stellenbosch, 1973), p. 5.
35  MH de Kock, Economic history…, p. 82.
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Land-related taxation had been part of the tax system since 1677.36 Transfer 
duties were introduced in 1686 and were levied on immovable property; these 
sources of revenue included a tax on landed freehold property and transfer 
duties on houses and the buildings on loan farms. The tax on landed freehold 
property was differentiated, with a higher rate of ten percent levied if freehold 
land was sold within three years of receiving the grant from the Company.37 
The transfer duty decreased on a sliding scale, according to how long a colonist 
retained ownership. This was done to discourage the sale of property soon 
after receiving the grant.
The VOC’s policies with regard to land ownership and the taxation of land 
helped to shape the early economic development of the Cape Colony. In 1657 
the first free farmers received full title to their land and exemption from all 
taxes for twelve years. For a number of years after the exemption expired, little 
effort went into collecting these “tithes”, because the Company recognised 
the cultivating difficulties faced by the free farmers and the burden of their 
obligation to repay debts incurred with the Company. This changed after 
Commissioner General Hendrik Adriaan van Rheede made the payment of 
tithes obligatory. Evasion was rife, however, since farmers had to transport 
their tithes to the Castle. In 1710 the Company decided to lease out the 
collection of the “tithes”, but no bids were forthcoming. In 1714, Governor 
De Chavonnes and the Council of Policy finally brought certainty to the 
system by instructing farmers to bring tithes to the Castle. The instruction 
also announced the introduction of an annual fee of twelve rixdollars for 
grazing rights. 
The land tenure system under Company rule had fiscal implications. After the 
initial issuing of freehold land, the Company instituted the loan farm system 
and, as the demand for land increased, began to charge rental income to defray 
the growing administrative costs and outlays required to protect farmers. At 
first, the holders of loan farms were restricted by certain boundaries to prevent 
the colonists from moving into frontier districts. The aim of these restrictions 
was to avoid increases in defence costs to protect these outposts. Eventually, 
however, movement into frontier districts was allowed, particularly after the 
threat of conflict with indigenous people had diminished and increases in 
rental income had lessened the fiscal burden on the Company.
36 W McCluskey, L Lim and P Davis, Land value taxation: An international overview (available at www.dfpni.gov.
uk/rating-review/uuj_-_land_value_tax_report.pdf, p. 20), as accessed on 26 September 2013, p. 20.
37 MH de Kock, Economic history…, p. 81.
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The Company received considerable revenue from the rental charges it 
imposed on the various property leasing schemes. The increase in the leasing 
of loan farms partly reflected the pressure on the Company to reduce its 
budgetary shortfalls by increasing revenue during the period of war with 
France and Spain (when Company ships were under attack and higher defence 
expenditure was required). Colonists had to pay annual rental charges on the 
loan farms of twelve rixdollars, later increased to twenty-four rixdollars per 
annum, regardless of differences in land fertility or its location.38 In 1732 a 
further system of loan tenure (quitrent) was introduced, which allowed the 
leasing of property for a specified period (fifteen years) at an annual payment 
(differentiated on the basis of soil fertility).
Local taxes
The VOC clearly stated the responsibilities of the “landdrosts” and 
“heemraden” who administered the districts of Cape Town, Stellenbosch, 
Swellendam and Graaff-Reinet. They dealt with financial matters to do with 
infrastructure (construction and maintenance of roads, bridges, churches 
and other buildings), remuneration (paying their own salaries and those of 
secretaries, district surgeons and other officials and workers), and numerous 
incidentals (firewood, stationery, hunting of beasts of prey, caring for lepers, 
and so on).39 The Company expected the district authorities to be self-
financing and made no provision for what is now known as intergovernmental 
fiscal transfers.40 The district authorities therefore levied three types of local 
tax to defray their expenses: poll tax, livestock tax and house tax.41 
The poll tax (known as “head money”) was implemented at the discretion 
of the “landdrosts” and “heemraden” in the districts of the Cape, Swellendam 
and Stellenbosch. In Cape Town and the Cape district, this tax was levied on 
the basis of property ownership.42 Property owners were taxed according to 
38 MH de Kock, Economic history…, p. 79.
39 PJ Venter, “Landdroste en heemrade”, CG Botha, C Beyers, JLM Franken and HB Thom (Eds), Argiefjaarboek 
vir Suid-Afrikaanse Geskiedenis – Deel II (Cape Town, Government Printer, 1960), pp. 146–147.
40 PJ Venter, “Landdroste en heemrade”, CG Botha, C Beyers, JLM Franken and HB Thom (Eds), Argiefjaarboek 
vir Suid-Afrikaanse Geskiedenis – Deel II (Cape Town, Government Printer, 1960), p. 141. According to PJ 
Venter, “Landdroste en heemrade”..., p. 161, the Company did not even provide disaster relief to the inhabitants 
of Stellenbosch in the aftermath of the devastating fire of 1710.
41 MH de Kock, Economic history…, p. 83–84.
42 MH de Kock, Economic history…, p. 83 points out that this was the oldest tax in the Cape Colony. It was 
originally a dedicated tax used for the killing of wild beasts and hence known as “lion and tiger money”.
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the ability-to-pay principle, whereas those without property had to pay a fixed 
amount of thirty-two stuivers per annum. The burgher council purportedly 
used property values and incomes to determine taxpayers’ liabilities, but the 
application of the ability-to-pay principle was marked by much arbitrariness 
and unfairness. In the districts of Stellenbosch and Swellendam the poll tax 
applied to persons aged sixteen or older who did not own any sheep or cattle: 
thirty-two stuivers per annum in Stellenbosch and thirty-six in Swellendam. 
Since ownership of cattle and sheep was a clear indication of wealth, this was 
the basis of another local tax in the districts of Stellenbosch, Swellendam and 
Graaff-Reinet. In these districts, colonists originally had to pay one stuiver per 
head of black cattle and sixteen stuivers per group of one hundred sheep, but 
the rates apparently varied over time.43 The third local tax, which was levied 
only in Cape Town, was the house tax (or “hearth money”) of four rixdollars 
per annum. This, too, was introduced as a dedicated tax that was used to 
finance the guarding of the town. It was levied originally on residential 
property, but later extended to commercial properties as well. According to 
Venter, the district authorities also earned small amounts of revenue from mill 
fees, the leasing out of mills, and fines.44
From 1686 onwards, VOC officials travelled the Colony with the “landdrosts” 
every year to determine the burghers’ tax liabilities. This proved a time-
consuming and expensive procedure for collecting taxes and the process was 
eventually entrusted solely to the “landdrosts” and “heemraden”. Already by 
1720, local officials were undertaking this task in Stellenbosch.45 In an early 
example of taxpayer-friendly revenue collection practices, district officials 
(many of whom were farmers themselves) structured the process to minimise 
disruption of burghers’ farming activities.46 The Company’s view that the 
districts should be financially autonomous was reflected in its initial decision 
not to entrust their financial management to its official representatives, 
the “landdrosts”. Instead, “heemraden” were appointed as treasurers, albeit 
assisted by secretaries (who were Company officials). However, the ability 
of many “heemraden” to fulfil the functions of treasurers was hampered by 
43 PJ Venter, “Landdroste en heemrade”, CG Botha, C Beyers, JLM Franken and HB Thom (Eds), Argiefjaarboek 
vir Suid-Afrikaanse Geskiedenis – Deel II (Cape Town, Government Printer, 1960), p. 142. See also HB Thom, 
Die geskiedenis van die skaapboerdery in Suid-Afrika (Amsterdam, NV Swets & Zeitlinger, 1936), p. 379.
44 PJ Venter, “Landdroste en heemrade”, CG Botha, C Beyers, JLM Franken and HB Thom (Eds), Argiefjaarboek 
vir Suid-Afrikaanse Geskiedenis – Deel II (Cape Town, Government Printer, 1960), p. 142.
45 PJ Venter, “Landdroste en heemrade”, CG Botha, C Beyers, JLM Franken and HB Thom (Eds), Argiefjaarboek 
vir Suid-Afrikaanse Geskiedenis – Deel II (Cape Town, Government Printer, 1960), p. 144.
46 PJ Venter, “Landdroste en heemrade”, CG Botha, C Beyers, JLM Franken and HB Thom (Eds), Argiefjaarboek 
vir Suid-Afrikaanse Geskiedenis – Deel II (Cape Town, Government Printer, 1960), p. 145.
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the demands of their private interests and their lack of expertise in financial 
matters, and the “landdrosts” became increasingly active in the financial 
management of the districts.47 The effects of this development on the quality 
of financial management in the districts varied.48
The district authorities were often unable to balance their books and thus 
they accumulated debts (Image 4). The unwillingness of the central authority 
to provide assistance forced the districts to borrow from the Orphan Chamber 
and wealthy residents.49
Image 4: Accumulated debt of Stellenbosch and Swellendam in selected years, 1702–1793
Source: PJ Venter, “Landdroste en heemrade”, CG Botha, C Beyers, JLM Franken and HB Thom (Eds), Argiefjaarboek 
vir Suid-Afrikaanse Geskiedenis – Deel II (Cape Town, Government Printer, 1960), p. 157. 
Expenditure
Expenditure by the Company can be divided into four broad categories, 
as shown in Image 5. The statistics for 1795 clearly show the importance 
of military expenditure by the Company in protecting its outposts. Further 
(negligible) items of expenditure included the cost of maintaining the 
Company’s slaves and the ships that were permanently based at the Cape. De 
Kock also mentions expenses that were incurred by the regiments (including 
the sick and convalescent members) that were not directly responsible for 
47 PJ Venter, “Landdroste en heemrade”, CG Botha, C Beyers, JLM Franken and HB Thom (Eds), Argiefjaarboek 
vir Suid-Afrikaanse Geskiedenis – Deel II (Cape Town, Government Printer, 1960), pp. 147–152.
48 PJ Venter, “Landdroste en heemrade”, CG Botha, C Beyers, JLM Franken and HB Thom (Eds), Argiefjaarboek 
vir Suid-Afrikaanse Geskiedenis – Deel II (Cape Town, Government Printer, 1960), p. 144 mentions that 
Landdrost Van Baalen found the coffers empty when he arrived in Graaff-Reinet in 1792. Information provided 
by other officials led him to conclude that public money had been “a good milch cow”. 
49 PJ Venter, “Landdroste en heemrade”, CG Botha, C Beyers, JLM Franken and HB Thom (Eds), Argiefjaarboek 
vir Suid-Afrikaanse Geskiedenis – Deel II (Cape Town, Government Printer, 1960), p. 157–159.
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defending the Cape.50
Image 5: Expenditure by category, 1795 (guilders)
Source: De Kock mentions considerable fluctuations in the extent of spending on public works and 
buildings but provides no exact figure. See MH de Kock, Economic History…, p. 78.
Another cause of expenditure was the maintenance of outposts. The 
importance of the Company’s trade in products from the East made the 
provision of refreshments to its shipping fleet crucial. When the Company 
received complaints from the ships’ captains about the insufficient supply 
of provisions, it expanded the capabilities of the Cape as a provision station 
by creating outposts beyond Table Valley. These outposts were essentially 
manned decentralised services under the management of the Cape Council 
of Policy.51 The staff stationed at these outposts received a salary like other 
soldiers, and also free accommodation and a food allowance. Their job was 
to deliver important goods such as grain products, meat, wood and fresh 
vegetables to the colony and the fleets. However, according to Sleigh, these 
outposts were financed by the Company at great cost and were not necessarily 
successful.52
Net revenues
The evidence of revenues and expenditures published over the course of 
the eighteenthth century supports the conjecture that the Cape Colony was 
never self-supporting. According to Groenewald, the Company, from the 
beginning, “ran at an enormous loss”.53 This trend continued throughout the 
period of Dutch rule, with expenditure consistently exceeding tax revenues, 
although the deficit shrank in later years. The losses were partly due to poor 
tax collection, tax evasion and corrupt officials. According to De Kock, after 
50 De Kock, Economic history…, p. 77.
51 D Sleigh, Die Buiteposte: VOC-buiteposte onder Kaapse bestuur 1652–1795 (Pretoria, Protea Boekhuis, 2004), 
Voorwoord.
52 D Sleigh, Die Buiteposte…, p. 739.
53 G Groenewald “‘More comfort, better prosperity, and greater advantage’: Free burghers, alcohol retail and the 
VOC authorities at the Cape of Good Hope, 1652–1680”, Historia, 57(1), 2012, pp. 1.
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the war with England (1780 to 1784) expenditure increased because more 
soldiers were being stationed at the Cape to fend off any foreign attacks.54 But 
it was also true that the governor at the time, Van de Graaff, incurred wasteful 
expenditure.
The important point to note for our argument is that even though the taxes 
described above seem severe, they never surpassed what the Company spent. 
Image 6 shows the revenue and expenditure (in guilders) in the Cape Colony 
for the period 1777 to 1794. The Colony experienced a deficit throughout this 
period. The deficit to GDP ratio increased to forty percent in 1789, probably 
because of poor harvests and a high wage bill, but decreased to eleven percent 
in 1792. Even with this reduction, the consistently significant budget deficits 
certainly do not reflect a highly extractive system.
Image 6: Revenues, expenditures and deficits (in guilders) as percentages of GDP
 
Source: MH de Kock, Economic History…, p. 78. 
Reconstructing the fiscal base from microdata
Most of the evidence presented thus far consists of data aggregated at the 
macro-level and gathered from secondary sources. Although this shows that 
the Cape was less extractive than previously thought, perhaps tax income was 
highly regressive, which may suggest that the elite exploited poorer settlers 
through the fiscal system. We therefore turn to data at household level – the 
annual censuses drawn up for the purposes of tax collection, the “opgaafrolle” 
– to investigate the incidence of taxation or, in other words, to establish which 
groups in Cape society bore the greatest tax burden. 
The “opgaafrolle” provide a wealth of individual-level production and asset 
54 MH de Kock, Economic history…, p. 77.
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data. The household records include information on an individual’s district 
of residence, family size, number of slaves owned, number of cattle, horses, 
sheep and pigs owned, number of vines planted and barrels of wine owned, 
inputs and outputs of wheat, barley and rye, and weapons owned. A full 
discussion of the “opgaafrolle” is provided by Fourie and Von Fintel.55 Using 
our information about the various taxes, we can estimate individual taxes as 
follows. Individuals with no assets paid only the basic poll (or “head”) tax of 
thirty-two stuivers. Individuals who owned slaves but no agricultural assets 
(excluding horses) paid hearth tax of four rixdollars if they lived in Cape 
Town; those outside paid thirty-two stuivers. Wine was taxed at one rixdollar 
per leaguer before 1743 and three rixdollars thereafter. Wheat, barley and rye 
were taxed at ten percent of the yield. We obtain a wheat price of six rixdollars 
per muid from Fourie and Von Fintel.56 We follow Brunt, who shows that 
barley and rye prices were roughly half those of wheat, and we therefore value 
it at three rixdollars per muid.57 Livestock ownership was taxed at one stuiver 
per head of cattle and sixteen stuivers for each one hundred sheep. The only 
direct taxes we do not include are property taxes as the “opgaafrolle” do not 
include information on property ownership. Indirect taxes, such as customs 
duties, are also excluded.
Image 7: Company revenue by income stream, 1700–1773
Source: Several opgaafrolle; own calculations, 1700–1773.
55 J Fourie and D von Fintel, “The dynamics of inequality in a newly settled, pre-industrial society”, Cliometrica, 
4(3), 2010, pp. 229–267.
56 J Fourie and D von Fintel, “A history with evidence: Income inequality in Dutch South Africa”, Economic 
History of Developing Regions, 26(1), 2011, p. 39.
57 L Brunt, Property rights…, pp. 43-44.
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Image 7 shows Company revenue by income stream between 1700 and 1773. 
The revenue from the sale of wine pachts was the most important source of 
income during the early years of the eighteenth century. It was only after the 
1730s that tax income exceeded income from the sale of wine pachts. By 
1773, income from direct taxes was more than sixty percent of total revenue.
We believe these numbers obtained from micro-level “opgaafrolle” data to be 
fairly accurate. Consider Image 6 again: revenue in 1777 as published by the 
Company was 200 000 guilders. Our estimate for revenue for 1773 is 174 434 
guilders. Extrapolating a linear trend from 1773 to 1777, we calculate total 
tax revenue as being very close to 200 000 guilders per annum.
To identify which group in society bore the heaviest tax burden, we have to 
rank society from poorest to richest. There are several ways to do this. Our 
selection is based on the available evidence. In Image 8, we rank households 
by the number of slaves they owned. As several historians have argued, slaves 
permeated Cape society and the number of slaves is an accurate reflection of 
a household’s wealth. Fourie also shows that slaves are the most accurately 
measured asset in the “opgaafrolle”.58 We then split tax revenue by the 
four sources of revenue: the poll tax, the wheat tax, the wine tax and the 
livestock tax. Image 8 aggregates all the years in our sample (the same as those 
represented in Image 7). 
Image 8: Four sources of household taxes by number of slaves owned
Source: Opgaafrolle; own calculations, 1700–1773.
58 J Fourie, “The remarkable wealth of the Dutch Cape Colony: Measurements from eighteenth-century probate 
inventories”, The Economic History Review. 66(2), 2013, p. 434.
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The results point to two important trends. Firstly, the poll tax was a regressive 
tax, meaning that the burden fell more heavily on the poorer part of society. 
This is expected, as economic theory shows that lump sum taxes like the poll 
tax are efficient but unfair.59 Secondly, as Image 8 shows, the amounts paid 
of the other three taxes increased as wealth increased (wealth is proxied here 
by the number of slaves owned). Unfortunately, because we use a measure of 
wealth, it is not possible to establish whether this is a regressive, proportional 
or progressive tax: such classifications are usually done with reference to levels 
of income, although a positive correlation between levels of income and 
wealth is likely.
Another way to measure tax incidence is to construct slave-owning deciles, 
rank them from poorest to richest, and then show the tax burden by decile. 
The result can be seen in Image 9: in 1700, the wealthiest ten percent of 
individuals at the Cape bore less than fifty percent of the tax burden; by 1773, 
their burden had increased to above sixty-one percent.
Image 9: Tax revenue by slave-owning decile, 1700–1773
Source: Opgaafrolle; own calculations, 1700–1773.
59 PA Black, E Calitz and TJ Steenekamp, Public economics (Cape Town, Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 185.
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These results offer strong evidence that the tax system imposed by the VOC 
was progressive on the whole, meaning that the wealthiest in society bore most 
of the tax burden, and that this progressiveness increased over the course of the 
eighteenth century. There is thus little in the household-level data to support 
the view that this was an extractive regime as defined by Frankema, with high 
levels of taxation to maximise revenue in order to enrich the colonial elites.60 
Rather, its tax regime was relatively equitable and spending by the colonial 
authorities far surpassed the revenue from the various income sources. Austin’s 
criticism of the bifurcation between “extractive” and “inclusive” colonies 
seems relevant; in the Frankema framework, a “night watchman regime” or 
even a “benevolent regime” would be a more apt classification of the fiscal 
regime of the Cape Colony.61 
Conclusions
Collecting taxes and using such revenue to finance public expenditure 
are core tasks of countries’ executive authorities. Analyses of economic 
policymaking in democracies often assume, either explicitly or implicitly, that 
elected officials attempt to promote or maximise long-run societal welfare. 
Yet, when a territory is governed by a company whose shareholders reside 
elsewhere, the aim of the authorities may well be to extract as much surplus 
as they can without endangering the continued viability of economic activity 
in the country.
This paper used the Dutch Cape Colony as a case study to investigate fiscal 
policymaking by the Dutch East India Company (VOC). We showed that, in 
contrast to the perceived extraction claimed by Adam Smith and the eighteenth-
century settlers, the Cape spent considerably more in public expenditure, 
including salaries for officials and soldiers stationed in Cape Town, than its 
revenue from production and trade taxes justified. We supported the limited 
secondary evidence with a reconstruction from household-level “opgaafrolle”. 
These “opgaafrolle”, collected for the purposes of tax collection, allowed us to 
segment the taxes by revenue source: we showed that the income from the sale 
60 E Frankema, “Colonial taxation and government spending in British Africa, 1880–1940: Maximizing revenue 
or minimizing effort?” Explorations in Economic History, 48, 2011, p. 138.
61 G Austin, “The ‘reversal of fortune’ thesis and the compression of history: Perspectives from African and 
comparative economic history”, Journal of International Development, 20, 2008, p. 1021; E Frankema, “Colonial 
taxation and government spending in British Africa, 1880–1940: Maximizing revenue or minimizing effort?” 
Explorations in Economic History, 48, 2011, p. 138.
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of wine pachts was the most important source of revenue for the Company 
during the early years of settlement. Only during the 1730s did revenue from 
tax overtake wine pachts as the dominant revenue source.
The “opgaafrolle” also allowed us to identify the incidence of taxation. We 
showed that wheat and wine producers paid taxes more progressively, i.e. the 
richest paid a larger share of their income in taxes than cattle farmers did. The 
poll tax is the only tax that was certainly regressive. We then created wealth 
deciles to show that, by 1773, the richest ten percent of settlers paid more 
than fifty percent of the taxes. The Cape’s tax system was not only progressive 
but was becoming more so.
Our findings raise questions. Why did the Company tolerate such a large 
deficit for such a long period of time? How equitable was the expenditure side 
of the Company’s budget? And were the settlers justified in their unhappiness 
with government tax policies or were they just reacting as taxpayers have 
always done? These are questions our dataset cannot readily address. But our 
results do suggest an answer to the fundamental question: did Adam Smith get 
it wrong in his assessment of the extractive nature of Company rule? Looking 
at the evidence of the “opgaafrolle”, we suggest a tentative yes.
